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Abstract 
Resale Price Maintenance (hereinafter ‘RPM’) can be defined as the practice whereby a manufacturer and 
a distributor agree that the former will sell the latter’s products at certain prices. RPM may take a variety 
of forms including fixed, minimum, maximum, or recommended resale prices. In general, practice of 
RPM may restrict the distributors’ freedom of setting their prices at the downstream level henceforth 
attracting the application of competition law. The paper aims to analyse the legal status of RPM in the 
context of competition law in European Union and Malaysia including the ways RPM is able to restrict 
competition. This paper contains a detailed  analysis of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter ‘TFEU’), the Competition Act 2010 (hereinafter ‘CA 2010’), related 
regulations, guidelines, case law, and scholarly writing in this area. The paper concludes that not all forms 
of RPM are prohibited under these two jurisdictions. Some of them are deemed illegal or anti-competitive 
because they are likely to harm competition and some of them may be permitted subject to the fulfilment 
of certain conditions. 
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Introduction 
In the rapidly growing business competition, manufacturers should not only think about 
manufacturing of their goods and services (hereinafter 'products') but also on how to distribute their 
products to consumers. Regardless of how ground-breaking the produced products are, manufacturers 
may still incur loss if the products do not reach the consumers. Thus, an important phase of the 
business activity is product distribution. Employing distributors is one of the methods of distribution 
that manufacturers could adopt to distribute their products (Jones & Sufrin, 2016). The manufacturers 
may enter into agreements or concerted practices (collectively referred to as ‘arrangements’) (both 
terms ‘agreements’ and ‘concerted practices’ will be defined later in the following paragraph) with 
distributors to distribute the products. Contents of the arrangements to protect the business interests of 
both parties may be discussed. In doing so, the arrangements may contain vertical restraints limiting 
the freedom of one or more of the parties as pointed out by Jones and Sufrin. The term ‘vertical 
restraints’ has been described by MacCulloch and Rodger (2015) as the restrictions which are 
employed in the distribution arrangements including RPM. RPM can be defined as the practice 
whereby “a manufacturer and a distributor agree that the distributor will sell the manufacturers’ 
products at certain prices” (Hubert, Leppard & Lécroart, 2014). RPM may take a variety of forms 
including fixed, minimum, maximum, or recommended resale prices. In general, practice of RPM 
may restrict the distributors’ freedom of setting their prices at the downstream level henceforth 
attracting the application of competition law. However, it is important to note that not all forms of 
RPM are prohibited in EU and Malaysia. Some of them are deemed illegal or anti-competitive 
because they are likely to harm competition and some of them may be permitted subject to the 
fulfilment of certain conditions. In short, parties to the distribution arrangements in both jurisdictions 
are not at full liberty to agree on everything in order to maximise their profitability at the expense of 
competition. So far, there has been little discussion about the position of RPM in Malaysia 
particularly with reference to the EU Competition law. Thus, the paper aims to analyse the legal status 
of all types of RPM in the context of competition law in European Union and Malaysia including the 
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ways they can restrict competition. In this paper, EU competition law is used as a focal point of 
discussion. This is because its enforcement agency, the EU Commission, has wide experience in 
dealing with the practice of RPM. A number of cases involving RPM have been investigated and 
decided by the EU Commission. Besides, the EU Commission has produced a detailed legal 
framework on RPM that can be found in its Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Art 101(3) of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1 (hereinafter ‘Regulation 330/2010') as well as the Vertical 
Guidelines [2010] OJ C130/1 (hereinafter ‘Guidelines 2010’). This research adopts a qualitative 
approach to analyse Article 101 of the TFEU, the CA 2010, related regulations, guidelines, case law, 
and scholarly writing in this area. The first part of the paper begins with the discussion on RPM in the 
context of EU competition law. The second part explains RPM in the context of Malaysian 
competition law. The third part deliberates on the similarities and differences between EU and 
Malaysian competition laws over RPM. The fourth part concludes the paper and presents a set of 
recommendations to provide more clarity to the existing legal framework on the practice of RPM in 
the distribution arrangements in Malaysia. 
 
RPM in the Context of EU Competition Law 
In EU, matters concerning competition are dealt with by the EU Commission. The EU Commission is 
responsible for enforcing EU competition law which aims to make better EU markets, by ensuring 
that all business players compete fairly on their merits (EU Commission, 2017). This has been 
reflected in Article 101 (1) of TFEU in which it prohibits arrangements between at least two 
independent undertakings which prevent, restrict, and distort competition in European States (the 
words ‘European States’ and ‘Member States’ will be used interchangeably throughout this paper). 
The inclusion of RPM in the distribution arrangements may fall under the prohibition contained in the 
said Article because of its potential anti-competitive effects on competition in EU (this will be 
discussed in detail in paragraphs 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 of this paper). The EU Commission’s stance towards 
RPM can be found in Regulation 330/2010 and further elaborated in the Guidelines 2010. To begin 
with, it is better to explain Article 101 of TFEU followed by the rest in order to know the scope of 
applications of the said Article to RPM contained in the distribution arrangements. This is because 
only distribution arrangements which meet all the conditions prescribed by the Article are subject to 
its prohibition. Indirectly, what is not covered by Article 101 of TFEU may be permitted subject to the 
national competition laws of the Member States. For the sake of clarity, the text is reproduced in full 
as follows:  
(1)  The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market, and in particular those which: 
(a)  directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b)  limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c)  share markets or sources of supply; 
(d)  apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e)  make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
In light of the above Article, it prohibits agreements or concerted practices between two or more 
independent undertakings which prevent, restrict, and distort competition in European States. In 
essence, the application of Article 101(1) of TFEU is subject to a number of conditions. First, there is 
an agreement or concerted practice between undertakings. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to 
Journal of Academia UiTM Negeri Sembilan Vol. 6, Issue 1 (2018) 67-78 
 
69 
clarify the following terms ‘agreement’, ‘concerted practices’ and ‘undertakings’. First, an agreement 
means “a concurrence of wills between at least two parties”1. Second, a concerted practice signifies “a 
form of coordination between undertakings that had not reached a formal agreement” 2. Whereas, the 
expression ‘undertakings’ refers to “as every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed” 3. (The terms ‘undertakings’, ‘parties’, 
and ‘enterprises’ are used interchangeably throughout the rest of this paper unless the context dictates 
otherwise). The minimum requirement of two independent undertakings is mandatory because of the 
letter ‘s’ which is added after the word ‘undertaking’ prescribed in the Article which indicates 
plurality. It is noted that Article 101 (1) of TFEU uses the general word ‘agreement’ encompassing 
both horizontal and vertical agreements. Hence, distribution arrangements meet the first condition 
because they are generally termed as ‘vertical agreements’ in light of competition law (Geradin, 
Layne-Farrar, & Petit, 2012). 
Second, the distribution arrangements may affect trade between Member States. The Court of Justice 
in the case of Consten & Grundig v Commission4 interpreted the phrase ‘affect trade between Member 
States’ as “to guarantee that competition in internal market is not distorted”. It is worth stressing that 
the Article only applies to the distribution arrangements which have an appreciable effect on trade 
between Member States. This was affirmed in Volk v Vervaecke5 where the Court decided that a 
distribution agreement falls outside Article 101 of TFEU when its effect on the market is determined 
to be insignificant. Since this case, the EU Commission has provided guidance on the application of 
the de minimis on the so-called agreements of minor importance in its Notice on Agreements of 
Minor Importance 20016 (Whish & Bailey, 2015). However, it is important to note that in 2014, the 
EU Commission revised the Notice to reflect the ruling of the Court of Justice in Expedia Inc. v 
Autorité de la concurrence and Others7. In this case, it was held that “an agreement that may affect 
trade between Member States and that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its nature and 
independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on competition”. This 
decision infers that although the market share held by each of the parties to the distribution 
arrangements does not exceed 15 %, but if such arrangements have as their object of restricting 
competition, they cannot benefit from a safe harbour of the Notice. In other words, such arrangements 
cannot be considered as minor because they have by definition an appreciable effect on competition 
(EU Commission, 2014). 
Third, the distribution arrangements must have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or 
distortion of competition. In  Societe Technique Miniere (STM) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH8, it was 
decided that both the words ‘object’ and ‘effect’ should be read disjunctively and not conjunctively to 
the effect that it is sufficient to prove either one of them only. In determining the existence of a 
restriction by object, it is necessary to look at the purpose of the distribution arrangements which have 
as their object the restriction of competition (Jones & Sufrin, 2016). For hardcore restrictions, they are 
considered by the EU Commission to constitute restrictions by object (EU Commission, 2013)9. That 
is to say, the Notice will not apply to the distribution arrangements which contain hardcore 
restrictions as prescribed by the EU Commission in its regulations. Restrictions by object are 
considered to be more serious than restrictions by effect because of their very nature of preventing 
competition in the market from functioning properly and effectively10. For that reason, they are 
presumed to infringe Article 101 (1) of TFEU.  
                                                          
1  Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure eV and Commission v Bayer [2004] 4 CMLR 13. 
2  Suiker Unie and others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663. 
3  Hofner and Elsner v Macroton [1991] ECR I-1979. 
4  [1966] ECR 299. 
5  [1969] ECR 295. 
6  OJ 2001 C368/13 (hereinafter ‘Notice’). 
7  (C-226/11). 
8  [1966] ECR 235. 
9  Paragraph 13 of the Notice. 
10 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty [Official Journal No C 101 of   
27.4.2004]. 
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From the discussion above, it can be summarised that the distribution arrangements which contain 
RPM may attract the application of Article 101(1) of TFEU if the arrangements involve at least two 
undertakings, and if the arrangements have an appreciable effect on trade between Member States and 
the agreements have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition. 
When all the requirements are met, the distribution arrangements concerned may fall under the 
prohibition of the said Article. However, the distribution arrangements are not immediately prohibited 
but will be further examined to determine whether the arrangements fall under the safe harbour of the 
Regulation 330/2010. Having said that, should the arrangements fall outside the safe harbour, the 
parties may still have an opportunity to defend their arrangements pursuant to Article 101 (3) of 
TFEU. 
The Scope of Application of Regulation 330/2010 
In essence, Regulation 330/2010 serves as a safe harbour exempting all vertical agreements subject to 
the fulfilment of its conditions11. The word ‘vertical agreement’ includes distribution arrangements as 
defined by Article 1(1)(a) of Regulation 330/2010. It is important to note that the Regulation 
330/2010 shall be read alongside the Guidelines 2010 to have a better understanding on the approach 
of the EU Commission towards RPM in the distribution arrangements (Faella, 2013). According to 
Article 3 of the Regulation 330/2010, the first condition that has to be met is that the market share of 
each party to the distribution arrangements does not exceed 30%12 and such arrangements do not 
contain hardcore restrictions of competition13. For the former, there is no presumption of illegality 
under Article 101 (1) of TFEU14. Whereas, in respect of the latter, presumption of illegality under the 
said Article will arise15. It is important to note that the distribution arrangements fall outside the safe 
harbour does not immediately imply that the arrangements are caught by the prohibition of Article 
101 (1) of TFEU. In both situations, parties can bring forward evidence that their arrangements will 
likely lead to efficiencies which will be examined under conditions stipulated in Article 101(3) of 
TFEU16. There is no presumption that the former will fail to meet the conditions of the said Article. 
However, in respect of the latter, they are unlikely to be exempted under Article 101(3) of TFEU17 on 
the grounds that hardcore restrictions are considered to be severe restrictions of competition18. 
Fixed and Minimum RPM 
A reading of Article 4 (a) of Regulation 330/2010 shows that fixed and minimum RPM are considered 
as hardcore restrictions. The effect of the inclusion of fixed and minimum RPM in the distribution 
arrangements does not only give rise to the presumption of illegality but also the arrangements are 
unlikely to be exempted under Article 101(3) of TFEU19. The EU Commission’s strong stance against 
the fixed and minimum RPM can be seen in paragraph 224 of the Guidelines 2010 in which the EU 
Commission succinctly sets out a number of ways where the fixed and minimum RPM can restrict 
competition and some of them can be summarised as follows: 
 
Firstly, price transparency is increased with fixed and minimum RPM20. When manufacturers are 
made aware of the fixed prices at the downstream level, this may give rise to competition concerns. 
Not only that, manufacturers of different brands (known as ‘inter-brand competition’) may engage in 
a collusion (Lorenz, 2013) agreeing on certain prices for the sale of their products. ‘Collusion’, 
according to the Oxford Dictionary (2017), means a “secret or illegal cooperation or conspiracy in 
order to deceive others”. Other colluding manufacturers may easily identify a manufacturer that 
                                                          
11 Article 3 of Regulation 330/2010. 
12 Ibid., Article 3(1). 
13 Ibid., Article 4. 
14 Paragraph 23 of the Guidelines 2010. 
15 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Recital 10 of the Regulation 330/2010.  
19 Paragraph 223 of the Guidelines 2010. 
20 Ibid., paragraph 224. 
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decides to diverge from the collusion (Buttigieg, 2015). Therefore, Stigler (1964) argued that price 
transparency is the crucial factor for stable collusion.  
Secondly, a manufacturer that has control over the market may utilise the fixed and minimum RPM to 
exclude their smaller competition21. This occurs when the inter-brand competition makes use of the 
same distributor to distribute their products. A strategy to guarantee higher profit margin at the 
downstream level may be devised whereby the manufacturer with market control imposes fixed and 
minimum RPM to their distributor as a method to ensure the latter prefers their brand over other rival 
brands22. This leads to the distributor recommending the manufacturer’s brand to customers over other 
brands by rival manufacturers, which leads to losses in sale and the risk of needing to terminate 
business operations due to market manipulation.  
Thirdly, the intra-brand competition may be restricted, and competition may also be eliminated among 
distributors through the use of fixed and minimum RPM23. This happens when distributors of the 
same manufacturer are unable to offer lower prices for the same products, as the manufacturers have 
already dictated the prices. This direct restriction of freedom for distributors leads to the customers’ 
inability to obtain products at lower prices. 
Fourthly, manufacturers may be pressurised by strong or well-organised distributors through the use 
of fixed and minimum RPM to set prices above the competitive level24. In this case, the fixed and 
minimum RPM lead to collusion among distributors at the downstream level. The distributors thus 
can rely on manufacturers to set the price on their behalf rather than setting the price themselves. 
Lastly, innovation and market entry at the distribution level may be hindered due to the lack of price 
competition between different distributors25. Due to fixed and minimum RPM, the distributors are 
constrained from offering discounts regardless of the innovativeness or efficiency levels of their 
distribution process. This further restricts the entry of more innovative and efficient distributors into 
the market as they can no longer fix lower prices to consumers. 
Maximum and Recommended RPM 
On the other hand, the practice of maximum and recommended RPM is not considered as hardcore 
restrictions and may benefit from a safe harbour of the Regulation 330/2010 subject to two conditions 
which are the market share of each of the parties does not exceed 30% and such practice does not 
amount to a minimum or fixed sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of 
the parties26. However should the market share held by each of the parties to the distribution 
arrangements exceeds the threshold, the inclusion of maximum or recommended RPM in the 
arrangements does not give rise to the presumption of illegality. Thus, such arrangements may be 
permitted subject to the satisfaction of all conditions under Article 101(3) of TFEU. 
The main argument supporting maximum RPM is to avoid double marginalization27. Maximum RPM 
plays its role by ensuring that distributors do not set an excessive profit margin over what was paid to 
the manufacturers, as this may lead to severe disadvantages to the consumer due to higher end prices 
(Faella, 2013). The recommended RPM remains a recommendation; it is not obligatory for the 
distributor to follow the recommendation. This means manufacturers may set the maximum or 
recommended RPM to the distributor as long as this is not equivalent to the fixed or minimum RPM 
due to any parties providing additional pressure or incentives28.  
                                                          
21 Paragraph 224 of the Guidelines 2010. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., paragraph 226. 
27 Ibid., paragraph 229. 
28 Article 4(a) of Regulation 330/2010. 
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Nevertheless, the practice of fixing maximum and recommended RPM by the manufacturers to their 
distributors is treated with caution by the EU Commission because they may give rise to competition 
concerns as well. First, maximum and recommended RPM serve as a focal point for distributors 
pricing and might be followed by most or all of them29. Second, the maximum or recommended prices 
may facilitate collusion between manufacturers and do not depart from them thereby softening 
competition at the upstream level30. The maximum and recommended RPM may be taken up as the 
preferred resale price rather than determining the resale price based on market conditions (Bernitz, 
2012). This situation is likely to happen when the manufacturers have strong market power and 
therefore the fixing of maximum and recommended RPM may be viewed to be the preferred resale 
price proposed by such important manufacturers on the market rather than responding to market 
conditions when determining resale prices31. 
The Applicability of Article 101 (3) of TFEU 
The fact that the arrangements fall outside the safe harbour does not immediately imply that the 
arrangements are caught by the prohibition of Article 101 (1) of TFEU. Such arrangements may be 
permitted subject to the fulfilment of conditions as set out by Article 101 (3) of TFEU. In other words, 
Article 101 (3) of TFEU provides a defence to parties to the distribution arrangements against a 
finding of an infringement of Article 101 (1) of TFEU32. The parties to the distribution arrangements 
can bring forward evidence that their arrangements will likely lead to efficiencies which will be 
assessed under conditions stipulated in Article 101 (3) of TFEU which reads: 
 (3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in 
respect of a substantial part of the products in question. 
 
The first condition is that the distribution agreements must improve the production and distribution of 
goods or promote technical and economic progress. Second, consumers must receive a fair share of 
the benefits. Fair share implies that the resulting benefit must at least compensate consumers for any 
negative impact caused by the restrictions of competition33. For instance if the agreement leads to 
higher prices, consumers must be compensated through better quality or other benefits34. Third, the 
restrictions of competition must be indispensable to achieve the objective sets out in the agreement. 
Restrictions must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the beneficial objectives of the 
agreement based on the concept of proportionality (Homewood, 2014). Fourth, the distribution 
agreements must not eliminate competition in the market.  
 
Theoretically, an exemption to practice fixed and minimum RPM may be sought under Article 101(3) 
of TFEU (Bernitz, 2012). However, such exemption is very unlikely to be granted (Nagy, 2013) as 
                                                          
29 Paragraph 227 of the Guidelines 2010. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., paragraph 228. 
32 Paragraph 1 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty.  
33 Paragraph 85 of the Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty. 
34 Ibid., paragraph 86.  
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seen in both the EU Commission’s decision and Guidelines 2010. The case of Hennessy-Henkell35 
reflects this. Hennessy and Henkell entered a distribution agreement whereby Henkel was appointed 
to sell Hennessey cognac in Germany. In the agreement, the fixed and minimum RPM clause stated 
that Hennessey would fix the resale prices for Henkell at the downstream level. The EU Commission 
decided that the clause restricted Henkell’s freedom to set its resale prices, which thus fell under the 
prohibition of Article 101(1) of TFEU. Paragraph 223 of the Guidelines 2010 stated for the latter “It 
also gives rise to the presumption that the agreement is unlikely to fulfil the conditions of Article 
101(3)”. Thus, even though a party may seek for an exemption under Article 101 (3) of TFEU, the 
success of it is very unlikely if the distribution arrangements contain either fixed or minimum RPM. 
On the other hand, for practice of maximum and recommended RPM, since there is no presumption of 
illegality, it may benefit from the exemption under Article 101 (3) of TFEU if parties to the 
distribution arrangements satisfy all the conditions of the said Article.36. 
RPM in the context of Malaysian Competition Law 
In Malaysia, competition matters are regulated by the Malaysia Competition Commission (hereinafter 
‘MyCC’). The MyCC is a body which was established under the Competition Commission Act 2010 
to enforce provisions of the CA 2010. Its primary function is to protect the competitive process for the 
benefit of businesses, consumers, and the economy37. Likewise in Malaysia, the practice of RPM is 
viewed as a potential threat to competition. The MyCC’s stance towards RPM has been succinctly 
expressed in its Guidelines on Chapter 1 Prohibition (hereinafter ‘Guidelines’). While it is necessary 
to understand the Guidelines in order to know the EU Commission’s stance towards RPM, an 
understanding of the Guidelines is not complete without having the knowledge first on the legal 
framework of section 4 of the CA 2010. In essence, section 4 of the CA 2010 prohibits any agreement 
which has its object or effect the restriction of competition in Malaysia. The full text of section reads 
as follows: 
 
(1)  A horizontal or vertical agreement between enterprises is prohibited insofar as the 
agreement has the object or effect of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting 
competition in any market for goods or services. 
 
(2)  Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), a horizontal agreement between 
enterprises which has the object to— 
(a)  fix, directly, or indirectly, a purchase or selling price or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b)  share market or sources of supply; 
(c)  limit or control— 
 
    (i)  production; 
    (ii)  market outlets or market access; 
    (iii)  technical or technological development; or 
    (iv)  investment; or 
(d)  perform an act of bid rigging, 
 
is deemed to have the object of significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting 
competition in any market for goods or services. 
 
(3)  Any enterprise which is a party to an agreement which is prohibited under this section 
shall be liable for infringement of the prohibition. 
 
                                                          
35 (Commission Decision) OJ 1980 L 383/1. 
36 Paragraph 229 of the Guidelines 2010 and the Court in Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de  
Paris Irmgard Schillgallis [1986] ECR 353. 
37 Preamble of the CA 2010. 
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In light of the above section, there are several conditions that have to be fulfilled for the application of 
the said section. First, the agreement is entered into by at least two enterprises. For the purpose of the 
CA 2010, the word ‘agreement’ includes concerted practices as defined by section 2 of the CA 2010 
(hereinafter ‘arrangements’). The term ‘enterprises’ is used to denote “any entity carrying on 
commercial activities relating to goods or services” resembling the meaning of ‘undertakings’ under 
the EU competition law. The section also applies to both horizontal and vertical agreement which is 
similar to the EU’s position. The term ‘vertical agreement’ has been defined by section 2 of the same 
Act to include distribution arrangements. Second, the arrangements must have the effect or object of 
significantly preventing, restricting, or distorting competition. The expression ‘significant’ has been 
elucidated in paragraph 3.4 of the Guidelines explaining that the arrangements “must have more than 
a trivial impact”. Section 4(2) of the CA 2010 recognises that certain restrictive horizontal agreements 
between enterprises (agreements between competitors) are regarded as anti-competitive. Examples of 
such restrictions are price fixing, production control, market sharing, and bid rigging. Under these 
circumstances, they are deemed to have as their object of significantly preventing, restricting, or 
distorting competition in the market.  
A reading of the above section indicates that the distribution arrangements which contain RPM do not 
fall under the section 4(2) of the CA 2010. Having said that, the distribution arrangements which 
contain RPM satisfying the preceding conditions may attract the prohibition of section 4(1) of the CA 
2010 because of its potential anti-competitive effects. In general, different forms of RPM may have 
different impacts on competition38. Therefore, the MyCC’s treatment over RPM may be different 
from one to another. The next paragraph will explain the Guidelines in detail shedding light on the 
MyCC’s approach over RPM. 
The Scope of Application of the Guidelines over RPM 
In essence, the Guidelines provide general guidance for the industry on the approach that will be taken 
by the MyCC in respect of restrictive horizontal and vertical arrangements. Basically, it provides a 
safe harbour using the market share as a parameter in determining whether the anti-competitive 
arrangements have a significant effect on competition or not. Similar to the approach adopted by the 
EU Commission, the MyCC also sets a market threshold which provides a safe harbour if the market 
share of each of the parties is less than 25%39.  
In paragraph 3.14 of the same Guidelines, the MyCC has stated that it will take a strong stance against 
minimum RPM and find it anti-competitive. Not only that, other forms of RPM such as fixed, 
maximum, and recommended RPM which serve as a focal point for downstream collusion are also 
considered as anti-competitive by the MyCC40. 
There are three ways for the parties to the distribution arrangements to relieve their liabilities for the 
infringement of section 4 of the CA 2010 which are through invoking section 5 of the CA 2010, 
applying individual exemption under section 6 of the CA 2010 and block exemption under section 8 
of the CA 2010. Each one of them has its own conditions. For the purpose of the paper, it will discuss 
the first two ways to get relief from liability under section 4 of the CA 2010 since no block exemption 
on vertical restraints particularly on RPM issued by the MyCC. 
Relief from Liability under Sections 5 and 6 of the CA 2010 
Basically, parties to the distribution arrangements may conduct a self-assessment based on the criteria 
set forth by section 5 of the CA 2010. There are 4 cumulative conditions that must be met by the 
parties that: 
 (a)  there are significant identifiable technological, efficiency, or social benefits directly 
arising from the agreement; 
                                                          
38 Paragraph 3.16 of the Guidelines. 
39 Ibid., paragraph 3.4. 
40 Ibid., paragraph 2.5. 
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 (b)  the benefits could not reasonably have been provided by the parties to the agreement 
without the agreement having the effect of preventing, restricting, or distorting 
competition; 
 (c)  the detrimental effect of the agreement on competition is proportionate to the benefits 
provided; and 
 (d)  the agreement does not allow the enterprise concerned to eliminate competition 
completely in respect of a substantial part of the goods or services. 
 
Having satisfied all the above conditions, the parties may then proceed with the arrangements and rely 
on this section as a defence should the MyCC decide to take action for violation of section 4 of the 
CA 2010.  
Alternatively, the parties may avoid the risk of violating section 4 of the CA 2010, by applying in 
advance from the MyCC for an individual exemption under section 6 of the CA 2010. Upon receiving 
the application, the MyCC will examine and analyse the application based on the criteria set forth in 
section 5 of the CA 2010. If the MyCC is satisfied that all the criteria are met, then the individual 
exemption may be granted. Such exemption given may be accompanied with some conditions or 
obligations as the MyCC considers necessary for a period time as may be determined by the MyCC41. 
Nestle Products Sdn. Bhd. (‘Nestle’) had once appealed for this section whereby the company applied 
for exemption for its pricing policy called ‘Brand Equity Protection Policy (BEPP)’ from the 
prohibition under section 4 of the CA 2010. The MyCC found that the policy included elements of 
RPM which led to concerns in competition, as pursuant to the policy, the distributors were unable to 
set their own prices, which led to increased prices. Therefore, the BEPP pricing policy was likely to 
infringe section 4 (1) of the CA 2010, which led MyCC to request Nestle to dismantle its pricing 
policy in BEPP (MyCC, 2013). 
Similarities and Differences between EU and Malaysian Competition Laws over RPM 
This part seeks to highlight the similarities and differences between the EU and Malaysian 
competition laws over RPM based on the discussions above on the RPM framework in both countries.  
Firstly, both countries set out the market share thresholds which provide the ‘safe harbour’ in their 
respective Regulation 330/2010 and the Guidelines. In EU, the safe harbour is provided in Regulation 
330/2010 exempting distribution arrangements if the market share of each of the parties does not 
exceed 30%, the arrangements do not contain fixed and minimum RPM as well as maximum or 
recommended RPM which are equivalent to the fixed or minimum RPM as a result of pressure from, 
or incentives offered by, any of the parties. Whereas in Malaysia, the safe harbour is stated in the 
Guidelines if the market share held by each of the parties is less than 25%. However, the Guidelines 
are silent as to whether the distribution arrangements falling below the specified thresholds but 
containing minimum RPM can benefit from the safe harbour of the Guidelines despite the fact that the 
MyCC will take a strong stance against it and finds it anti-competitive. 
Besides, in EU, the practice of minimum RPM is regarded as hardcore restriction. Thus, it does not 
only give rise to the presumption of illegality but also the practice is unlikely to be exempted under 
Article 101(3) of TFEU. Hence, even though the parties may seek for an exemption under Article 101 
(3) of TFEU, but the success of it is very unlikely if the distribution arrangements contain either fixed 
or minimum RPM. In contrast, under the Malaysian law, although the MyCC finds the practice of 
minimum RPM anti-competitive but the Guidelines are silent as to whether it will be excluded from 
benefitting the safe harbour of the Guidelines nor is disqualified from exemption under section 5 of 
the CA 2010.  
                                                          
41 Section 6(4) of the CA 2010. 
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Moreover, in EU, it is plainly elucidated in the Guidelines 2010 that the practice of maximum and 
recommended RPM covered by the Regulation 330/2010 should the market share of each of the 
parties fall within the scope of safe harbour and such practice does not amount to a minimum or fixed 
sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered, by any of the parties. Conversely, in 
Malaysia, there is no such similar provision in the Guidelines. 
In EU, the parties of the distribution arrangements may proceed with the RPM clause by complying 
with the criteria as spelt out in Regulation 330/2010, or should the criteria not be met, by satisfying all 
the requirements stipulated under Article 101(3) of TFEU as a defence against any action by the EU 
Commission. It should be noted that in EU, there is no longer necessary for the parties to the 
distribution arrangements to notify the EU Commission in order to obtain individual exemption. In 
other words, the burden is placed on the parties themselves to ensure their distribution arrangements 
do not violate Article 101 (1) of TFEU (Storey & Turner, 2014). Before Regulation 1/200342 was 
enacted on 1st May 2004, the EU Commission had to be notified for exemption to be granted under 
Article 101(3) of TFEU43. Due to this requirement, the EU Commission was swamped with 30,000 
notifications of exclusive distribution agreements alone (Kaczorowska, 2016), which led to a divert in 
the Commission’s resources from focusing on more severe cases pertaining to competition, such as 
cartel (Kennedy, Cahill, & Power, 2011). Regulation 1/2003 was introduced to overcome this issue 
and abolish the notification system. Malaysia, in contrast, provides three methods for parties to the 
distribution arrangements to proceed with the RPM clause. The first is by invoking section 5 of the 
CA 2010 together with the Guidelines as a defence against an action taken by the MyCC. The second 
is by applying for individual exemption under section 6 of the CA 2010. The third is by satisfying the 
criteria set out in block exemption under section 8 of the CA 2010. However, block exemption in 
respect of vertical restraints particularly RPM has not yet in place unlike Regulation 330/2010 in EU.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In conclusion, this paper discusses the legal framework of RPM in EU and Malaysian competition 
laws in distribution arrangements. In general, the practice of RPM is viewed as a potential threat to 
competition. Thus, distribution arrangements which contain RPM may violate Article 101 (1) of 
TFEU and section 4 of CA 2010. Having said that, both countries provide a safe harbour to the parties 
to the distribution arrangements. In EU, Regulation 330/2010 serves as a safe harbour exempting 
distribution arrangements if market share of each of the parties does not exceed 30%, the 
arrangements do not contain fixed and minimum RPM as well as minimum or recommended RPM 
which are equivalent to the fixed or minimum RPM as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered 
by, any of the parties. On the other hand, the practice of maximum and recommended RPM is not 
considered as hardcore restrictions and may benefit from exemption under the Regulation 330/2010 
should the market share of each of the parties does not exceed 30% and such practice does not amount 
to a minimum or fixed sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the 
parties. Nevertheless, should the arrangements fall outside the safe harbour, it does not immediately 
imply that the arrangements are prohibited by Article 101 (1) of TFEU. Such arrangements may be 
permitted subject to the fulfilment of conditions set out in Article 101 (3) of TFEU. Having said that, 
in practice, for fixed and minimum RPM, the exemption under Article 101 (3) of TFEU is very 
unlikely as discussed in paragraph 2.1.4. Whereas in Malaysia, the safe harbour is stated in the 
Guidelines if the market share held by each of the parties is less than 25%. The MyCC has stated that 
it will take a strong stance against minimum RPM and find it anti-competitive. Not only that, other 
forms of RPM such as fixed, maximum, and recommended resale prices which serve as a focal point 
for downstream collusion are also considered as anti-competitive by the MyCC. However, the 
Guidelines are silent as to whether the distribution arrangements falling below the thresholds but 
containing minimum RPM and other forms of RPM which serve as a focal point for downstream 
collusion can benefit from the safe harbour of the Guidelines should the arrangements fall within the 
                                                          
42   Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Official Journal L 1, 04.01.2003. The Regulation aims to 
provide a more efficient and effective competition law enforcement. 
43   Article 4(1) Regulation 17/62. 
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specified market share threshold. Similar to the EU’s approach, should the distribution arrangements 
fall outside the safe harbour, it does not immediately imply that the arrangements are caught by the 
prohibition of section 4 of the CA 2010. The parties may relieve their liabilities for the infringement 
of the prohibition through invoking section 5 of the CA 2010 or applying for individual exemption 
under section 6 of the CA 2010. 
The followings are suggestions to improve the existing Guidelines. First, if the MyCC views that it is 
unlikely for minimum RPM to be exempted under section 5 of the CA 2010 because of its harmful 
effects on competition, then it is proposed that the MyCC clearly states in the Guidelines that the 
practice of minimum RPM is unlikely to fulfil the conditions of section 5 of the CA 2010 like in the 
EU. The proposal is aimed to send a clear message to the industry players that minimum RPM is 
highly discouraged.  
Second, it has not been plainly stated whether the practice of maximum and recommended RPM 
which does not serve as a focal point for downstream collusison can benefit from the safe harbour of 
the Guidelines should the market share of each of the parties is less than 25%. For businesses which 
plan to practice maximum and recommended RPM on the grounds stated in paragraph 2.1.3, this lack 
of explanation may lead to uncertainty. It is therefore important for the MyCC to clarify such position 
in the Guidelines to aid business players in their operations. 
Lastly, in Malaysia, unlike the EU, less focus is given on the potential positive effects of RPM on 
competition. The main focus is more on the anti-competitive effects of RPM. Thus, it is recommended 
for the MyCC to provide an economic viewpoint on RPM in terms of its advantages and 
disadvantages in the Guidelines, on top of discussing the matter from the legal perspective, to add 
further understanding of the public. 
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